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The November 2009 Romanian presidential elections illustrate the process through
which media exposure to exit polls during the election day allows strategic voting in the
least expected situations (i.e. in the ﬁrst round of a two-ballot setting). Organized in a
two-round system in which the ﬁrst two competitors qualify for the second round, these
elections display one unsolved dilemma. The difference registered in elections between
the two challengers is twice as large as the average support in the pre-election polls (a
comparable difference was never registered in post-communist Romania). Our quantitative
analysis uses election results from the past two decades and aggregated poll data from 2009
and reveals that a large share of the Romanian electorate avoids wasting votes and casts them
for candidates with real winning chances. This article argues that polls presented to the
voters, by the media during the elections, made the difference. They were used as electoral
strategies to trigger strategic voting and thus promote speciﬁc candidates.
Introduction
For a few decades, politicians and social scientists have approached election polls from
speciﬁc perspectives. The former tried to understand how citizens will vote in the next
electoral contest, whereas the latter are interested to know whether the voting behaviour
is inﬂuenced by polls. Such a preoccupation is legitimate in the context of generally
decreasing party membership,1,2 growing electoral volatility,3 and extended use of media
and the internet. Numerous studies reveal that opinion polls before elections inﬂuence the
voting4–8 mainly in the form of bandwagon and underdog effects. Both these situations
are inextricably linked8–10 and reﬂect shifts in voters’ attitudes once they learn about
candidates’ chances to win.
With this picture in mind, in real-life politics the mechanism can be controlled. As
soon as politicians are aware of such reactions in the electorate, they can use opinion
polls to improve their situation. This instrumental approach applies once general trends
are observed. By focusing on a single-case study as an illustrative example (e.g. the most
recent presidential elections in Romania), this article reveals how strategic voting trends
identiﬁable within the electorate can be channelled towards speciﬁc outcomes. Exit polls
broadcast during Election Day in the ﬁrst round made the difference between the two
challengers competing to confront the incumbent in the second round. Our central
argument evolves around the differences between the opinion polls and the election
results, not encountered so far in post-communist Romania for the top candidates. Based
on evidence from the past two decades and poll data from 2009, we show how a large
share of the Romanian electorate avoids wasting votes and casts them for candidates with
real winning chances. Facing this opportunity, candidates in pole-positions create their
own safety net by displaying poll results that indicate them as winners during voting.
By adding this empirical piece to the general puzzle regarding the relationship
between voters, opinions, and the importance/perceived importance of their cast votes,
we bring a twofold contribution to the literature. We challenge the theoretical arguments
of institutional and electoral system/reform scholars,11,12 according to which the two-
round electoral system allows citizens to vote sincerely in the ﬁrst round (and strategi-
cally in the second). We show how, for the Romanian elections, strategic voting is
possible in the ﬁrst round when citizens are exposed to the results of exit polls. Thus, we
reveal the mechanism that advances election polls as effective and efﬁcient tools of
inﬂuencing citizens’ decision during voting. In this respect, at empirical level, we document
how politicians can use their knowledge about electorates’ preferences to manipulate rational
behaviours (e.g. strategic voting, cue-taking). Thus, we identify a supplementary source of
pressure that builds on the existing willingness of the voters to avoid the low importance/
effectiveness of their opinions. The latter comes at the expense of changing the personal
preference and, in our case, modifying the structure of the second round of elections.
In the next part of the analysis we investigate the tendency of the Romanian electorate
to orient itself towards the likely winners of elections in the entire post-communist
period. The subsequent section includes the assessment of the bandwagon effect for the
2009 presidential elections based on aggregated poll data and statistical results. This sets
the premises for using exit polls during elections as promoting tools for successful
candidates. The third section explores in detail this mechanism and illustrates how voters
were mobilized in a speciﬁc direction. Finally, our conclusions summarize the main
ﬁndings and draw attention to the major implications of this single case study.
AVisible Pattern
Our exploratory endeavour starts from the general category summarizing voters’ beha-
viours that lead to bandwagon effects. Bartels13 distinguishes four different types of
psychological processes that make the individual voter choose the side expected to win:
contagion, supporting the winner, strategic voting, and cue-taking. The ﬁrst refers to a
situation in which voters associate with candidates perceived to suddenly improve their
winning chances. Supporting the winner originates in the voters’ need to increase their
self-esteem: some are happy to support the side that wins elections. Strategic voters base
their choice on a rational calculus that indicates the candidates with higher chances to
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win the elections. Cue-takers back candidates with the highest chances to win among all
contesters.14 To these four types, Kenney and Rice6 add the inevitability situation where
citizens cast votes for the candidate that is perceived as inevitably winning the elections,
although they prefer another candidate. Empirical studies display mixed evidence
regarding the existence of such effects within the electorate15–17 and conceptually reﬁne
the differences between voters’ reasons to jump on the bandwagon. Aware of such
nuances, our article emphasizes the strategic component of such behaviour, including all
these emotional and rational decisions of the voters when casting their vote.
The empirical evidence from all the Romanian presidential elections from the post-
communist period is in line with the theoretical considerations about the strategic behaviour.
Cox18 explains that, in general, there are three viable candidates in a two-round system and
voters strategically desert non-viable candidates. On average, excluding the ﬁrst elections of
1990 with three candidates, the Romanian elections have ten candidates. The elections are
organized in a two-round system where the ﬁrst two competitors get into the second round,
since generally no one obtains 50%1 1 of votes. The 1990 elections were the only time the
contest was won won from the ﬁrst round, with 85.07% of the votes (Figure 1). Despite a
large number of candidates, approximately 85% of the electorate in Romania regularly votes
for the ﬁrst three candidates in the ﬁrst round. Figure 1 reveals the percentages obtained by
candidates perceived as having real winning chances. For most of the election years, this is
the sum of the votes obtained by the ﬁrst three candidates, for 1990 we represent the
percentage obtained by the winner, and for 2000 we included the ﬁrst four candidates as the
difference between the third and the fourth was approximately 2%.
Although straightforward, such a situation was blurry for many candidates that in
those elections scored much less than opinion polls revealed. Apart from the difference
between declared intention to vote and actual choice in the voting booth, there is also the
trend of channelling options to diminish the waste of votes, to maximize personal
happiness by voting with the winner and other similar causes. All these occur when the
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Figure 1. Percentage of votes obtained by candidates with real winning chances (ﬁrst
round): 1990–2009.
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electorate had clear views regarding likely winners of the ﬁrst round. Consequently, a
vast majority of the electorate casts votes for a small number of competitors, irrespective
of their names, party labels, etc, instead of dividing their options. Thus, their opinion
becomes less important. The graph does not capture the votes of the Hungarian minority
(5–7%) that constantly supports in the ﬁrst round the candidate promoted by their party
(the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania). In such conditions, more than 90%
of the entire electorate appears to vote following two stable lines: the ethnic vote (i.e. the
Hungarian minority) and the winner-oriented vote.
The opinion polls preceding the 2009 presidential elections indicate a similar pattern.
Citizens deserted the non-viable candidates, although there were promising prospects
when launching their candidacy, and focused on the ﬁrst three candidates with the help of
the media (as shown in the following section). The peculiar component of these elections
is that the strategic behaviour was not limited to the shaping of preferences before the
elections, but acted also during the voting process. Different from the previous elections,
it was a two-stage process that implied in its ﬁnal part a narrowing down from three to
two options during the ﬁrst round.
The Media Effect
Our argument includes the media as one of the main mediators and promoters of factual
information.19 Apart from its feature that allows speciﬁc groups to convey truncated
messages to a mass of voters,20 the media represents a relevant supplier of knowledge for
voters needing to improve the basis of their decision-making. Through the publication of
speciﬁc news, reports, and editorials on certain candidates, and by reporting polls, it
inﬂuences voters’ perceptions about candidates’ odds to win elections. Whereas the ﬁrst
three tools of media coverage imply degrees of subjectivity, the reporting of polls does
not have to be biased in order to inﬂuence voters’ perceptions. The bulk of factual
information crucial for the decision-making and strategic voting resides in the percen-
tages of support for candidates. Our case-study shows how this is a decisive factor in
orienting voters’ choice towards the predicted outcome. Indeed, presenting the ﬁrst half
of the candidates’ list according to support and placing in the ‘another candidate’
category many competitors, amounts to a bias that diminishes the chances of the latter for
visibility and actual support in the booth. All these instances contribute to the guidance
of the voters lacking the default value of party/candidate identiﬁcation.9
Throughout the entire year, and during the electoral campaign for the Romanian
presidential elections, the media environment was marked by numerous examples of
biased reporting and/or truncated info. When citing opinion polls, Realitatea TV con-
stantly referred to the ﬁrst four candidates, completely obscuring the rest. Important news
portals (hotnews.ro) generally presented only the ﬁgures predicted by pollsters for the
ﬁrst three candidates, while only attaching the ‘.pdf’ ﬁles with the rest of the predictions.
There were three debates broadcasted nationally before the ﬁrst round, and even the way
they were organized implicitly reﬂected the desire of diminishing the vote shares of the
candidates placed below the third position in polls. As a result of the various strategic
calculations made by their staffs and the psychological wars between them,21 in the two
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most important electoral debates only the incumbent, Traian Basescu (supported by the
Democratic-Liberal Party, PD-L) and the challengers with most chances: Mircea Geoana
(from the Social Democratic Party, PSD) and Crin Antonescu (from the National Liberal
Party, PNL), had the opportunity to participate. The national television organized a
separate meeting for all the candidates playing in the ‘second league’.
Together with these biased elements, the poll reporting in Romanian media contributes to
voters’ perception of election winners. By considering 50 election polls conducted between
January 20 and November 21 (the last day before elections), we observe a direct linear
relationship between the time left until elections and the clustering of vote intentions around
the three main candidates perceived as possible winners of the ﬁrst round. The polls were
based on national probabilistic samples using different stratiﬁcation techniques, while only a
small number of them deployed CATI. They were ordered either by the media trusts or by
the parties/candidates. The ﬁrst row of the coefﬁcient values (Pearson r) presented in Table 1
indicates the strength of correlation between the time when polls are conducted and the sum
of votes directed towards the ﬁrst three candidates. For the entire period (January–November)
there is a visible weak-to-medium tendency to cluster votes for these candidates. However,
closer to elections (four months and two months before), the clustering is stronger (i.e. both
the value of the coefﬁcient and the statistical signiﬁcance increase). Beneﬁting from a history
of a few months, for the August–November period, voters reorient their preferences towards
the best-positioned candidates. Every poll conducted closer to Election Day reveals higher
numbers of vote intentions for one of the three. Such a relationship is the strongest in the last
two months before elections when the value of the correlation coefﬁcient reaches 0.83.
Summing up, there is a progressive tendency for voters, with a peak in the last months before
elections, to express their preference for one of the best positioned candidates.
This observation is strengthened by the evolution of support for candidates considered
to be relevant challengers when announcing their candidacy (Figure 2). We limit the
graphical representation to the last two months before elections. The candidates registering
the highest drops between their initial and ﬁnal levels of support are the independent Sorin
Oprescu (mayor of Bucharest and former PSD member) and George Becali representing the
New Generation Party, successful in the European elections on the list of the Greater
Romania Party (PRM). Entering the race later, Oprescu reached average levels of 12–13%
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Figure 2. Evolution of vote intentions for promising challengers.
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with peaks of 16% one month before elections. However, in November 2009, the decrease
started and reached a minimum level of 5% one week before elections. His actual result was
below this level. Becali maintained an average level of 5% in October, with peaks of 8% in
some polls, ending with 1.3% in the polls one day before elections and similar results after
the booths were closed. The most stable candidate from this cluster was Corneliu Vadim
Tudor, leader of PRM, whose oscillations were minor and the decrease of support con-
siderably smaller compared with Oprescu and Becali. Situated at 8% in early October, his
support decreased to 5%, a situation also registered during voting.
Returning to the ﬁgures in Table 1, the difference between the second and third candidates
(i.e. Geoana and Antonescu) is directly linked with the prospect of elections only when
including the entire 2009 year in the analysis. Thus, for the period January–November, the
value of the coefﬁcient is medium (0.32) and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that the
difference between these candidates has a moderate tendency to increase as soon as elections
are closer. However, the rest of the numbers in the same table reveal that this is not the case for
the last four months before elections. There is almost no relationship between the difference
of support between the two candidates when analysing the August–November and October–
November periods. In the isolated cases when the relationships occur (r50.05), their pre-
sence may be incidental (not statistically signiﬁcant) and displays opposing trends. In this
respect, the August–November period indicates a very weak tendency to witness the slight
narrowing of distance as elections draw closer, whereas for the October–November period the
opposite is visible: a very weak correlation between marginally increased difference and time.
As a result, the distance between the two challengers did not suffer modiﬁcations in the last
months before elections, although the general ﬁgure indicates that throughout the year Geoana
increased the distance from Antonescu. Most of this process took place in March–July 2009
where the correlation is 0.29 (statistically signiﬁcant, not reported in the table), which is very
similar to what we witness for the entire January–November time span.22
These issues constitute the premises for the Election Day political marketing based on
exit polls conducted at the voting stations immediately after citizens cast their votes.
With a bandwagon effect visible within the electorate in every previous election and in
the most recent ten months, and with a rather stable distance between the second and
third candidates, on 22 November the incumbent and main challenger could count on
two beneﬁts after revealing exit polls to the voters. On the one hand, they perpetuate the
Table 1. Statistical relationship between time and votes intentions for the best-positioned three
candidates
Correlation coefﬁcients Jan–Nov 2009 Aug–Nov 2009 Oct–Nov 2009
Sum of votes for the three main
candidates
0.25* 0.72** 0.83**
Difference between the second
and third candidate
0.32* 20.05 0.05
* Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05
** Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.01
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bandwagon during elections: people willing to vote for the third positioned candidate
may give up or shift sides seeing the partial results. On the other hand, the ﬁgures above
show that the distance from polls secured the main challenger a seat into the second
round. The regular exit polls could also accomplish the simple mission of avoiding a
spectacular turnover of the undecided. In this way, the possible occurrence of an
underdog effect during elections could be controlled.
Exit Polls for the Public
Following the logic of the bandwagon effect and the trend of the Romanian electorate
described above, the poll released on the eve of the elections is relevant. It indicates that
the incumbent (Basescu) is supported by 36% of the electorate, the main challenger
(Geoana) receives 25% of the votes, whereas the second challenger (Antonescu) gets
23.5% of the votes. Summing up these percentages and comparing them with the actual
percentage of votes received (Figure 1), we observe an almost perfect match: 84% of the
voters decided to cast votes for one of the three candidates. However, the election results
indicate that the support for Basescu and Antonescu was overestimated, whereas for Geoana
it was underestimated.23 As in all the polls the ﬁrst position belonged to the incumbent and
this was conﬁrmed by the results, the stake of this ﬁrst round of elections involved, as
previously mentioned, the battle for the second position between Geoana and Antonescu.
Overall, the average difference of support between the two was of approximately 5% in the
polls. However, the last poll issued and three out of ﬁve polls in the ﬁnal week before
elections revealed smaller differences (1.5–2%).24 What could be done? The direct answer
was to ensure voters during elections that the order of winning positions is similar to what
they had been used to for 11 months. The tool at hand was to display exit poll results during
voting.25 As the electoral law does not cover this issue, such a practice could be easily
implemented. The mechanism was effective for two main reasons, both detailed below: the
structure of the media and previous knowledge on the voters’ proﬁle.
The Romanian media structure closely resembles the ‘polarized pluralist’ typology of
media systems associated usually with Southern Europe.26 One of the most important
characteristics of this is the ‘political parallelism’ of the media, and indeed almost
every Romanian media outlet had a parti-pris in the presidential elections. There are two
news channels that gather the largest audiences – Realitatea TV and Antena 3. The former
belongs to the Realitatea-Cat¸ avencu media corporation that bounced between the
social-democrat candidate (slightly more favoured on Realitatea TV) and the incumbent
president – whose supporters were grouped at the Cotidianul newspaper and then
reorganized in the virtual opinion platform, Voxpublica. Similarly, Antena 3 is owned
by the founder of the Conservative Party (PC), Dan Voiculescu, who had enforced a
traditionally positive coverage of PSD, the party that has helped the PC surpass the
electoral threshold each and every election since 2000. A popular show at this station
(‘Sinteza Zilei’) criticized the incumbent president almost every day of his mandate.
During the entire day of the ﬁrst round, Realitatea TV constantly advertised the exit
polls. These were provided on its website, taking advantage of the fact that there is no
internet regulation regarding these issues. Realitatea TV even presented the exit-polls live
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at 20.40,27 thus before the closing of the polls (Active Watch-Press Monitoring Agency,
2009). All exit polls presented during that day included only the ﬁgures for the ﬁrst three
candidates (Voxpublica, 2009; Academia Cat¸ avencu, 2009). Exit-polls with similar or
different ﬁgures from the rest also appeared on the journalists’ blogs (pesurse.ro, sutu.ro)
and websites of smaller news portals (inpolitics.ro). By taking these actions, media
corporations fulﬁlled the instrumental task of displaying information that may trigger
bandwagon effects among voters during elections. The liberal candidate, directly affected
by such practices ﬁled an ofﬁcial complaint since presenting him at 20% or even below
could depress signiﬁcantly his electorate (Voxpublica, 2009).
The second component of the mechanism is represented by the voters’ proﬁle.
Research conducted during previous elections and data from the opinion polls reveal a
certain pattern within the Romanian electorate: old, rural, and less-educated voters tend
to vote in the morning hours, whereas young, urban, and highly educated people usually
vote in the evening (Gaˆndul, 2009). Each candidate and party attracted speciﬁc portions
of the electorate. For example, Geoana is mainly voted for by people from the category
that votes in the morning, whereas Basescu and Antonescu share the votes of people
voting later during the day. In addition, 33.5% of the Romanian voters that have a
university degree have preferred Antonescu, whereas Geoana gathered the votes of only
22.8% of them. Moreover, 38.6% of Geoana’s voters have graduated only from primary
school. In addition, 41.6% of the voters above 60 preferred Geoana, and no less than
36.3% of those living in rural areas (CURS exit poll on 18,000 people, in Evz.ro, 2009).
Consequently, the exit poll results presented to the public in the ﬁrst hours reﬂect an
overestimation of electoral support for Geoana and underestimation for Basescu and Anto-
nescu. The latter was affected the most as he also occupied the third position in the opinion
polls before elections. The triggered bandwagon effect worked against this candidate,
favouring mostly the main challenger (Geoana). The strategy of promoting a speciﬁc candidate
involves no costs from the party or the media and no biased information. At the end of the day,
the results of the exit polls reﬂected the real results of voting. However, this approach does not
allow capturing how much of this resemblance is caused by strategic voting, triggered by the
public availability of early results. In other words, we cannot know for sure whether the poll
results reﬂect reality or reality was inﬂuenced by poll results. By opening the possibility to
further investigate this possible reversed causality, our case becomes more relevant.
The innovation of this political priming strategy lies in the combination of two
components that cannot often go together. The presentation in a favourable light of a
candidate during elections was done without breaking the laws (that forbid propaganda
without signalling that is paid advertisement), but still running the risk of compromising
the image of media corporations by clear association with a candidate. In the second
strategy, the dissociation between media and candidate is possible through the ‘neutral’
approach of presenting what exit polls report. Here there are no value judgements, no
truncation, and no interpretations done by the media channels. Voters are presented with
raw facts and it is up to them to take a decision. However, this entire process is inten-
tional and controlled as the message transmitter builds its actions on existing knowledge
about the audience. The mechanism functioned and proved efﬁcient: the election results
indicate a difference of more than 11% between the two challengers (twice as much as
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the average difference between them registered in the 2009 polls). Although some polls
predicted this difference in October and early November, the ﬁnal result is highly likely
to be due to the mechanism explained above.
Conclusions
This article challenges the existing literature on two-round electoral systems by providing
one example in which voters behave strategically even in the ﬁrst round. On the one hand, it
reveals that sincere voting11 does not take place even when the prospects of wasting votes are
low, such as in the ﬁrst round. On the other hand, the Romanian case illustrates that the
exposure to exit polls in the media reduced the number of three viable candidates18 to only
two. As soon as the public was provided with information about the probability of the
outcome in the ﬁrst round, it acted strategically. The media did not have to provide biased
information, but only to make available to the public the results of exit polls conducted
throughout the entire Election Day. This simple model proved efﬁcient when used.
These ﬁndings are strengthened by two empirical aspects. First, the total percentage of
votes received by the top three candidates is similar in the opinion polls and the election
results. The major difference occurs in their distribution. The post-communist electoral
history of Romania shows that it is not a simple coincidence that voters desert the
candidates with fewer chances to progress. Based on this observable pattern, the media
published exit polls during the Election Day, available to all those who voted or were
preparing to vote (i.e. starting at 10.00 am). Second, although our evidence does not
support a deterministic process, the public exposure in the media of the exit poll results is
the only newcomer in the system, all other components being constant compared with
previous elections (e.g. party mobilization, electoral campaign, and so on). It coincides
with the supplementary strategic behaviour within the electorate, having numerous
reasons to believe that the two variables are linked, as we have shown in the text.
Although our study relies on the investigation of a single case, its implications are
broader. It can be easily imported into other political systems, conditioned by the fulﬁlment
of two preconditions. The ﬁrst is to have a rather lax/non-regulated Web, and a structure of
the media paralleling the political parties. The second condition is the volatility of the various
electorates, and their eagerness to vote strategically. Both preconditions are common in many
young democracies from Eastern Europe to South America.
The limitations of our research derive mainly from the sophistication and novelty of the
investigated technique of triggering strategic voting. The statistical analysis uncovered some
of these effects, but they still need to be corroborated by another type of data. That is why a
way of improving the model we proposed is to add quantitative survey data, weighting the
answers of voters who decided for whom to vote later in the campaign, or more importantly,
who switched their preferences due to media exposure and a desire not to waste their vote.
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